Price Fixing—Proving Injury Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act by Indirect Purchasers Relaxed by Expansion of Exceptions to Illinois Brick by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 60 
Issue 2 Topics in Corporation Law 
January 1982 
Price Fixing—Proving Injury Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act by 
Indirect Purchasers Relaxed by Expansion of Exceptions to Illinois 
Brick 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, and the Litigation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Price Fixing—Proving Injury Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act by Indirect Purchasers Relaxed by 
Expansion of Exceptions to Illinois Brick, 60 WASH. U. L. Q. 716 (1982). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss2/19 
This Recent Development is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University 
Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
716 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 60:705
ANTITRUST LAW -PRICE FIXING-PROVING INJURY UNDER SEC-
TION 4 OF THE CLAYTON ACT BY INDIRECT PURCHASERS RELAXED BY
EXPANSION OF EXCEPTIONS To ILLiNois BRICK. In re Mid-Allantic
Toyota Antitrust Litigation, 516 F. Supp. 1287 (D. Md. 1981). In In re
Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litigation,I automobile purchasers, indi-
vidually and through state parenspatriae actions,2 sued Mid-Atlantic
Toyota Distributors, Inc., Carecraft Industries, Ltd., and various
Toyota dealerships for conspiring to fix an artificially high price for
polyglycoat finishes in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.3
Plaintiffs also sought treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton
Act.' Defendants moved to dismiss, claiming that Illinois Brick Co. v.
1. 516 F. Supp. 1287 (D. Md. 1981).
2. A state attorney general may bring aparenspatriae action on behalf of any resident who
would otherwise have a cause of action under the antitrust laws. 15 U.S.C. § 15c (1976). See
generally Note, Scaling the Illinois Brick Wall The Future of Indirect Furchasers in Antitrust Liti-
gation, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 309, 325-27 (1978).
Theparenspatriae plaintiffs were Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, and the District of Co-
lumbia. 516 F. Supp. 1287, 1289 n.l (D. Md. 1981).
3. Id. at 1289. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in re-
straint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is de-
clared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any
combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a fel-
ony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million
dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars or by
imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion
of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
4. Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything for-
bidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States in
the district in which defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the
amount in controversy, and shall recover three fold the damages by him sustained, and
the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
The underlying purpose of the antitrust laws is the promotion of competition in an open mar-
ket. E.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 342 (1979). The antitrust laws provide public
and private mechanisms for enforcing sanctions against antitrust violators. The award of treble
damages.under § 4 is a potent private antitrust enforcement weapon. Section 4 has two primary
objectives: to deter antitrust violators by depriving them of the "fruits of their illegality," and to
compensate antitrust victims for their injuries. E.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.,
429 U.S. 477, 485-86 (1977); Beane, Passing-On Revived- An Antitrust Dilemma, 32 BAYLOR L.
Rnv. 347, 348 (1980).
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Illinois5 barred plaintiffs, as indirect purchasers,6 from proving injury
under section 4.1 Plaintiffs responded that the facts fell within the ver-
tical conspiracy exception to Illinois Brick.' The district court denied
defendants' motion and held: Indirect purchasers may recover treble
damages for price-fixing antitrust violations under section 4 of the
Clayton Act when difficulties in tracing damages and the risk of dupli-
cative liability are not present.'
In Illinois Brick the United States Supreme Court restricted the abil-
ity of indirect purchasers to recover treble damages from antitrust vio-
lators under section 4 of the Clayton Act.10 Indirect purchasers of
concrete block sued eleven concrete block manufacturers for conspiring
5. 431 U.S. 720 (1977). See notes 10-25 infra and accompanying text.
6. An indirect purchaser is a purchaser who is more than one step removed in a chain of
distribution from a seller. For example, a consumer who buys from a retailer who, in turn, bought
from a manufacturer is an indirect purchaser of the manufacturer.
7. 516 F. Supp. at 1289. See note 18 infra and accompanying text.
8. 516 F. Supp. at 1294-95. See notes 26-36 infra and accompanying text.
The plaintiffs and the court referred to the vertical conspiracy exception as the co-conspirator
exception. 516 F. Supp. at 1295 n.18.
9. 516 F. Supp. at 1294. See notes 19-21 infra and accompanying text. The court held also
that the vertical conspiracy exception was consistent with the policy considerations underlying
Illinois Brick. 516 F. Supp. at 1295. See notes 45-50 infra and accompanying text.
10. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
Courts use three approaches to limit the scope of § 4. In Illinois Brick the Supreme Court
barred a method of proving damages under § 4 by prohibiting indirect purchasers from using the
pass-on theory. See note 18 infra and accompanying text. The Supreme Court in Brunswick Corp.
v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977) limited the type of injury that falls within § 4 to
"antitrust injuries." The court held:
[Flor plaintiffs to recover treble damages on account of § 7 violations, they must prove
more than injury causally linked to an illegal presence in the market. Plaintiffs must
prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended
to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful. The injury
should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts
made possible by the violation.
429 U.S. at 489. See generally Note, The Third Circuit's "Functional Analysis' Patrolling the Por-
tals to Treble Damages Actions Brought Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 21 B.C.L. REv. 659,
666-67 (1980). The courts of appeals have limited those who can sue by construing the language,
"by reason of," in § 4 to require plaintiffs to prove legal causation or "antitrust standing." See,
e.g., Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 919 (1952). The circuits, however, have split on the test used to determine antitrust standing.
The direct injury test focuses on the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, denying
standing if the plaintiff is not the person to whom the defendant directed the violation. The target
area test focuses on the region of the economy affected by the antitrust violation. Plaintiffs have
standing if they are within the target area of the violation-"that area of the economy which is
endangered by a breakdown of competitive conditions in a particular industry." Id. at 54-55. For
a discussion of the "direct injury" and "target area" tests for antitrust standing, see Berger &
Bernstein, An Analytical Frameworkfor Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE L.J. 809 (1977); Note, supra.
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to fix prices in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act." Plaintiffs
alleged that intermediate purchasers in the chain of distribution in-
creased their prices to compensate for the defendants' overcharges.
Thus, plaintiffs claimed that the pass-on' 2 of defendants' overcharges
resulted in their injuries. The defendants contended that the Court's
holding in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. ,"s com-
pelled the Court to permit only direct purchasers in a chain of distribu-
tion to sue under section 4. In Hanover Shoe, the Court barred
defendants from asserting as an affirmative defense that overcharges to
direct purchaser plaintiffs were passed on by the plaintiffs to their
customers. 14
The Illinois Brick Court, stressing the need for symmetry' 5 with Han-
over Shoe's ban on defensive pass-on, 16 precluded indirect purchasers
from using the offensive pass-on theory17 to prove section 4 injuries.' 8
11. The defendants sold concrete blocks to masonry contractors who, in turn, sold them to
general contractors. The general contractors incorporated the concrete blocks in masonry struc-
tures and sold the structures to the plaintiffs. 431 U.S. at 726-27.
12. "Pass-on" refers "to the process whereby a businessman who has been overcharged ad-
justs his own price upward to reflect the overcharge." McGuire, The Passing-On Defense and the
Right ofRemote Purchasers to Recover Trebel.Damages Under Hanover Shoe, 33 U. Pirr. L. REV.
177, 181 (1977). Pass-on also refers to the passing on of undercharges up a chain of distribution.
See In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 600 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
905 (1980). See also note 33 infra.
13. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
14. A shoe manufacturer challenged the validity of a shoe machinery manufacturer's "lease-
only" policy. Plaintiff claimed injury from the increased costs incurred by defendant's refusal to
sell its machinery. As an affirmative defense, the machinery manufacturer argued that plaintiff
did not sustain a § 4 injury because any illegal overcharge to plaintiff was passed on by plaintiff to
its shoe customers. The Supreme Court, in rejecting the defendant's argument, held that antitrust
defendants are barred from using pass-on defenses to escape § 4 liability. The Court offered two
reasons for its decision. First, the inherent difficulties in proving pass-on are normally insur-
mountable. Second, successful use of defensive pass-on would allow antitrust violators to escape
liability, because indirect purchasers, such as the shoe customers in Hanover Shoe, would lack a
sutfficient stake in any recovery to bring suit independently. Id. at 481.
15. But see 431 U.S. 720, 748 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan argued that
the deterrence policy underlying the defensive pass-on prohibition did not mandate a bar on of-
fensive pass-on. A strict bar on offensive pass-on would allow some antitrust violators to escape
punishment. Id.
16. In defensive pass-on the defendant alleges, as an affirmative defense, that the direct pur-
chaser plaintiff passed on the overcharge to its customers and, therefore, did not suffer a § 4 in-
jury. Eg., 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
17. In offensive pass-on the plaintiff indirect purchaser alleges injury from overcharges
passed on by intermediate purchasers in the chain of distribution. Schaefer, Passing.On Theory/n
Antitrust Treble Damages Actions: An Economic and LegalAnalysis, 16 WM. & MARY L. REV.
883, 884 (1975).
18. 431 U.S. 720 (1977). Although the Court did not bar indirect purchasers from seeking
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The court offered two policy justifications for its decision. First, and
foremost, tracing an overcharge through a chain of distribution usually
presents an insurmountable problem of proof.' 9 A variety of factors,
both rational and irrational, affect product price determinations. Eco-
nomic pricing theories thus are incapable of reconstructing complex
pricing decisions accurately enough to apportion responsibility for the
effects of an overcharge in different levels of modern distribution
chains.20 Second, permitting offensive, but not defensive, pass-on sub-
jects defendants to the risk of duplicative liability.2 A direct purchaser
could recover the full amount of an overcharge under Hanover Shoe,
even though an indirect purchaser had already recovered for all or part
of the overcharge passed on to it.
The Illinois Brick Court expressly recognized two limited exceptions
to its holding: the preexisting cost-plus contract exception, 22 and the
relief under § 4, id. at 728 n.7, the practical effect was the same. The indirect purchasers were
unable to prove their injuries without the aid of the pass-on theory and, as a result, were unable to
proceed to trial. Id.
The decision creates a paradox, in light of the Supreme Court's recent holding that ultimate
consumers have standing to sue under § 4. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979). Because
ultimate consumers usually are indirect purchasers, the Supreme Court granted a § 4 remedy with
one hand, and took it way with the other.
19. 431 U.S. at 731-32, 741-43. One commentator has observed that:
The practical difficulties of employing pass-on theory begin with the realization that
few, if any situations arise where an overcharge is completely passed on to indirect pur-
chasers. That portion of the overcharge passed on is determinable, in theory, through
the use of economic analysis .... Unhappily, it is difficult, if not impossible, to deter-
mine with reasonable certainty the facts needed to apply this analysis. Even if concepts
like price-elasticity of demand were ascertainable, the element of irrationality in pricing
and purchasing would render the analysis suspect.
Note, supra note 2, at 312. For an in-depth discussion of the economics of pass-on, see Schaefer,
supra note 17, at 887-97. Compare Landes & Posner, Should Indirect Purchasers Have Standing to
Sue Under the Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis ofthe Rule of Illinois Brick, 46 U. CHi. L.
REv. 602 (1979) (pro-Illinois Brick) and Landes & Posner, The Economics ofPassing-own A Reply
to Harris & Sullivan, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 1274 (1980) (same) with Harris & Sullivan, Passing on the
Monopoly Overcharge: .4 Comprehensive Policy Analysis, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 269 (1979) (anti-
Illinois Brick) and Harris & Sullivan, Passing On the Monopoly Overcharge: A Response to Landes
& Posner, 128 U. PA. L. Rev. 1280 (1980) (same).
20. 431 U.S. at 731-32, 741-43. The Court stated: "[I]t is unrealistic to think that elasticity
studies introduced by expert witnesses will resolve the pass-on issue. . . . 'Sound laws of econom-
xcs' can only heighten the awareness of the difficulties and uncertainties involved in determining
how the relevant variables would have behaved had there been no overcharge." Id. at 742-43.
21. Id. at 730-31. Although procedural devices such as compulsory joinder would eliminate
most if not all potential for duplicative liability, the Court found that such devices would further
complicate already complex proceedings. Id. at 740.
22. Id. at 735-36. In a fixed quantity, cost-plus contract the buyer agrees to bear the risk of
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss2/19
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ownership or control exception.23 In both of these situations market
forces do not control the effect of the defendant-seller's overcharge on
the indirect purchaser;24 rather, the effect is determined in advance.
25
Federal courts, subsequent to Illinois Brick, have recognized a third
exception. Indirect purchasers can circumvent Illinois Brick by proving
a vertical conspiracy involving remote sellers and intermediate pur-
chasers in a chain of distribution. 6 Proof of the conspiracy reclassifies
the indirect purchaser as a direct purchaser of the conspiracy, thereby
obviating plaintiffs' need for the pass-on theory to establish a section 4
injury.27
Gas-a-tron of 4rizona v. American Oil Co. 21 was the first case to rec-
ognize the vertical conspiracy exception.29 The Arizona District Court
conditioned denial of the defendants' motion for summary judgment30
future increases in the seller's cost of production. An overcharge to the seller from an antitrust
violator is automatically passed on to the buyer, insulating the seller from injury. The ease with
which the overcharge is traced removes the cost-plus contract from the concerns of Illinols Brick.
For a comprehensive discussion of the cost-plus contract exception, see Note, A Door/n the Illinois
Brick Wall-A Functional Equivalent to the Cost-Plus Contract Exception, 33 VAND. L. REV. 481
(1980).
23. 431 U.S. at 736 n.16. The ownership or control exception exempts indirect purchasers
who purchase from direct purchasers that are owned or controlled by antitrust violators. The
Court suggested the scope of the exception by citing two cases in which the direct purchaser was
either owned or financially controlled by the antitrust violator. Id. See also Royal Printing Co. v.
Kimberly-Clark Corp., 621 F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1980) (financial control requires control over pric-
ing decisions); In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 600 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1979) (control
through "acquisition of stock, or indirectly through various financial arrangements, including
credit"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 (1980).
24. See notes 22-23 supra and accompanying text.
25. 431 U.S. at 736.
26. See e.g., Fontana Aviation, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 617 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1980); In re
Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 600 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 (1980);
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 486 F. Supp. 115 (D. Minn. 1980); Dart Drug Corp. v. Coming Glass
Works, 480 F. Supp. 1091 (D. Md. 1979); Gas-a-tron of Arizona v. American Oil Co., 1977-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) T 61,789 (D. Ariz. 1977). But see Technical Learning Collective, Inc. v.
Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft, 1980-81 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 63,612 (D. Md. 1980).
27. See, eg., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 486 F. Supp. 115 (D. Minn. 1980); Gas-a-tron of
Arizona v. American Oil Co., 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 61,789 (D. Ariz. 1977). See generally
Note, supra note 2, at 331-32.
28. 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,789 (D. Ariz. 1977).
29. Id. In Gas-a-tron retail sellers of gasoline alleged that two oil refiners had conspired to fix
the wholesale price of gasoline in Tucson. The retail sellers purchased their gasoline from in-
dependent distributors who, in turn, purchased from the oil refiners. The middlemen distributors
were neither named as co-conspirators nor joined as defendants in the complaint. Id.
30. Most of the cases involving the vertical conspiracy exception are resolved at the pre-trial
summary judgment stage of litigation.
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on an amendment to plaintiffs' complaint that would name the middle-
men-distributors as co-conspirators. 3' The court reasoned that proof of
the conspiracy would enable the plaintiffs to establish section 4 injury
without resorting to the pass-on theory.32 No pass-on theory would be
necessary if the plaintiffs could prove a direct purchase from a member
of the price-fixing conspiracy.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in In re BeefAntitrust Litigation33
concluded that a plaintiff claiming the vertical conspiracy exception
must, in addition to naming the co-conspirators in the complaint, join
the middlemen as defendants. 34 Otherwise, proof of a vertical conspir-
acy would subject remote seller defendants to the risk of duplicative
liability that the Illinois Brick Court found unacceptable.3 5  The de-
fendants would be unable, in a separate lawsuit brought by the middle-
men, to use the first suit's vertical conspiracy holding to estop the
middlemen from successfully asserting in their own lawsuit that there
was no conspiracy.36 The Fifth Circuit observed that inconsistent adju-
dications on the existence of a vertical conspiracy would enable both
indirect purchasers and middlemen to recover for a single overcharge.3 7
31. Gas-a-tron of Arizona v. American Oil Co., 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,789 (D. Ariz.
1977). Accord, Fontana Aviation, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 617 F.2d 478, 481 (7th Cir. 1980);
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 486 F. Supp. 115, 118-19 (D. Minn. 1980); Abrams v. Interco Inc., 1980-
2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,292, at 75, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
32. 1977-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,789. The court neither considered nor argued that its
decision overcame Illinois Brick's concern for the risk of duplicative liability. Id. See also Reiter
v. Sonotone Corp., 486 F. Supp. 115 (D. Minn. 1980); Note, supra note 2, at 331-32.
33. 600 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 (1980). In In re Beef the fact
pattern was the reverse of that in Illinois Brick. Plaintiffs, cattle ranchers and feeders, alleged that
retail food chains conspired to fix the wholesale price of beef at artificially low levels. The plain-
tiffs claimed injury from the pass-on of the defendants' undercharges by middlemen slaughter-
houses and meat packers. Id. at 1153.
34. Id. at 1163. Accord, Dart Drug Corp. v. Coming Glass Works, 480 F. Supp. 1091, 1103
(D. Md. 1979); In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation,
497 F. Supp. 218, 228 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
35. 600 F.2d at 1163.
36. Id. But see Technical Learning Collective, Inc. v. Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft,
1980-81 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,612 (D. Md. 1980). In Technical Learning Collective, Judge
Northrop argued that joinder of the middlemen co-conspirators would not eliminate all risk of
duplicative liability. He interpreted Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392
U.S. 134 (1968), to hold that the doctrine ofinparidelicto was not a defense to an antitrust action.
Judge Northrop cited Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Corp., 451 F.2d 3, 15-16 (4th Cir.
1971), for the general proposition that antitrust co-conspirators are barred from seeking treble
damages from each other only when their economic strength is substantially equal. Technical
Learning Collective, Inc., 1980-81 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,612 at 77,252-53.
37. 600 F.2d at 1163.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss2/19
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In In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litigation,38 Judge Young,
before considering the vertical conspiracy exception, addressed the
broader issue of whether the two exceptions expressly mentioned in Illi-
nois Brick were exclusive.39 The judge reasoned that the Supreme
Court premised recognition of the cost-plus contract and control excep-
tions on the supposition that tracing complexities are avoided when
market forces are obviated.40 He then argued that application of the
Illinois Brick rule would be inappropriate if the reasons for the rule,
including the risk of duplicative liability, did not exist.41 Concluding
that the Supreme Court only intended the exceptions to serve as guides
for determining other exceptions to the rule,42 Judge Young proposed a
standard for recognizing exceptions to Illinois Brick. The Mid-Allantic
Toyota standard permits indirect purchaser lawsuits whenever there
are no tracing problems and "only a 'mere possibility'4 3 of duplicative
liability" exists."
Judge Young next addressed the issue of whether an exception of
vertical conspiracies satisfies the requirements of the proposed stan-
dard.45 He concluded that tracing complexities are avoided when the
plaintiff purchases directly from a member of the conspiracy.46 He also
concluded that joinder of the co-conspirators as defendants would
eliminate all but a "mere possibility" of duplicative liability.47
The In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litigation decision is consis-
38. 516 F. Supp. 1287 (D. Md. 1981).
39. Id. at 1293. See notes 22-23 supra and accompanying text.
40. 516 F. Supp. at 1293.
41. Id. at 1297 n.14. But see Technical Learning Collective, Inc. v. Daimler-Benz Aktien-
gesellschaft, 1980-81 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 63,612, at 77,254 (D. Md. 1980) (Illinois Brick unequivo-
cally barred the offensive use of the pass-on theory with two narrow exceptions).
42. 516 F. Supp. at 1293.
43. The standard for avoiding duplicative liability is not absolute because under the control
exception found in Illinois Brick there always "exists at least the 'mere possibility' that the 'con-
trolled' direct purchaser will eventually bring a price-fixing suit against the supplier." Id. at 1294.
See also id. at 1293 (discussing footnote 11 to 111nois Brick).
44. Id. at 1294.
45. Id. at 1294-95.
46. Id. at 1295.
47. Id. at 1295-96. Judge Young disagreed with Judge Northrop's conclusion in Technical
Learning C "ective, Inc. v. Daimler-Benz Atktiengesellschaft, 1980-81 Trade Cas. (CCH)
63,612 (D. Md. 1980), that joinder of the middlemen co-conspirators would not eliminate the risk
of duplicative liability. Judge Young understood Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts
Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968), to hold that some aspects of the in par! de/icto doctrine should be
retained under the antitrust laws. He also interpreted Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co.,
451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971), to hold that any party who voluntarily and equally participates in a
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tent with the policy considerations underlying Illinois Brick.48  The
standard proposed by Judge Young prevents some of the harsh results
of a narrow construction of Illinois Brick's exceptions. Direct purchas-
ers often lack the incentive to sue when they are dependent on the seller
for supplies or are able to pass on the overcharge without injury to
themselves.49 In these situations, indirect purchasers are often the only
parties interested in challenging an antitrust violation. Prohibiting in-
direct purchaser lawsuits when tracing complexities are non-existent
and the risk of duplicative liability is negligible simply permits antitrust
violators to escape liability. Such a result directly contravenes the de-
terrence and compensation goals underlying section 4 of the Clayton
Act.50
The In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litigation decision promotes
enforcement of the antitrust laws by increasing the potential number
and variety of indirect purchaser suits51 without undermining the poli-
cies of Illinois Brick. 2
M.E
price-fixing conspiracy cannot sue a co-conspirator under § 4 of the Clayton Act. 516 F. Supp. at
1295-96.
48. See notes 40-42 supra and accompanying text.
49. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 745 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
50. See note 4 supra.
51. A likely first step is the recognition of exceptions for situations that are the functional
equivalents of the cost-plus contract, control, and vertical conspiracy exceptions. See generally
Note, supra note 22 (arguing for a functional equivalent to the cost-plus contract exception).
52. Lower federal courts never accepted Illinois Brick enthusiastically. The creation of such
exceptions as vertical conspiracy reflects this sentiment. Courts have also limited Illinois Brick to
overcharge cases. It does not apply generally to other forms of antitrust monetary injury. See,
eg, Mid-West Paper Products Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573 (3d Cir. 1979) (only
applicable to overcharges induced by horizontal price-fixing conspiracy); Dart Drug Corp. v.
Coming Glass Works, 480 F. Supp. 1091 (D. Md. 1979) (inapplicable to suit based on an alleged
agreement not to deal); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1246
(E.D. Pa. 1980) (inapplicable to suit against competing manufacturer for lost sales).
Congressional attempts to overturn Illinois Brick have been ineffective. See Beane, supra note
4, at 362-64; Wallace, Another Year of Signcant Congressional Objectives, 48 ANTIrrRUST L.J.
1519, 1527-29 (1979).
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